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ARGUMENT 
Pipe Renewal Service LLC (herein "PRS LLC"), a Utah limited liability company, 
would have this Court believe that it lawfully occupied approximately twenty (20) acres 
of Ray Hunting's (herein "Ray") industrial Property located in Vernal, Utah, at the 
monthly rental rate of $2,000.00, as an unidentified third party beneficiary to an alleged 
lease agreement between Ray and a separate third party Utah corporation - Pipe Renewal 
Service Inc. (herein "PRS Corporation"). However, Ray submits that the Trial Court 
properly determined that PRS LLC was a month-to-month tenant of Ray Hunting and in 
unlawful detainer of the Property.1 R. 341-342. The uncontroverted Record evidence (in 
the form of an expert opinion of Paul Throndsen, MAI) was that the appraised monthly 
fair market rental value of the Property is the sum of $ 13,450.00 per month. See, 
1. At pages 2-3 of the Trial Court's November 1, 2008, Ruling and Order, Judge 
Anderson opined as follows: 
"The Court is convinced by the argument and the citations to Utah law that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to unilaterally raise rents when the landlord and tenant 
have failed to memorialize the lease in writing. In such an instance, the lease 
is month-to-month. If the Defendant was concerned about a unilateral rent 
increase, the Defendant could have negotiated with the Plaintiff and sought to 
reduce the lease agreement to writing. The Court has not be presented with 
any evidence indicating that Plaintiff is not legally entitled to unilaterally 
increase rent in this case. Because the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to increase rent, and because the Defendant concedes receiving notice of the 
rent increase and failing to pay the increase amount, and because the Plaintiff 
served the Defendant with a notice to vacate, and because the Defendant did 
not pay the increased rent and did not vacate, the Court can lawfully conclude 
that the Defendant is in unlawful detainer of the subject property." R. 341-
342 (Ruling and Order dated November 1, 2008, attached as Exhibit L to the 
Addendum of Ray's Appeal Brief). 
Throndsen Affidavit at f 3. R. 644-645; 666-749; 700-709. Ray only sought, however, to 
increase PRS LLC's month-to-month rent to the sum of $7,500.00, which is substantially 
less than the undisputed monthly fair market rental value of $13,450.00. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing Record evidence, PRS LLC argues that the Trial Court "ruled" that Ray 
suffered no actual damages incident to PRS LLC's unlawful detainer of the Property. 
Ray respectfully submits that PRS LLC's argument should be rejected in its entirety. 
The Trial Court committed reversible error by refusing to treble the damages 
awarded to Ray against PRS LLC. PRS LLC admits that where a defendant is found in 
unlawful detainer, and damages are properly entered, those damages are required to be 
trebled by statutory mandate. PRS LLC's Appeal Brief at p. 29, 34. However, PRS LLC 
attempts to avoid the entry of trebled damages by arguing: 1) Rule 19 Ut.R.Civ.P. 
requires joinder of PRS Corporation as a party; and 2) Trial Court made implicit findings 
of fact that: (i) PRS Corporation was in sole possession of the property during the 
2. Ray respectfully submits that the Trial Court went out of its way to afford PRS LLC 
every opportunity to present evidence in opposition to the amount of Ray's requested 
damages however PRS LLC failed to avail itself of the opportunities afforded by the Trial 
Court and did not present any evidence regarding the rental value of the property 
presumably because PRS LLC was well aware of the fact that the increased rental amount 
was well less than the current fair market rental value. Pursuant to the Trial Court's 
suggestion during Oral Argument on January 30, 2007 (R. 872 at p. 33-38), Ray had an 
appraisal of the Property conducted by an MAI appraiser, Paul Throndsen. 
3. Ray increased PRS LLC's monthly rent from $2,000.00 to $7,500.00 per month 
effective September 1, 2005. R. 68, 821. PRS LLC does not dispute in its Reply Brief 
that the failure to object to a rent increase while continuing in possession constitutes an 
agreement to the increased rent or that prior to the filing of this lawsuit, PRS LLC never 
responded or objected to either the Rent Increase Notice or the Three Day Notice. See, 
Ray's Appeal Brief at p. 38 citing Beinap v. Fox, 251 P. 1073, 1075-6 (Utah 1926); See 
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relevant time period; and (ii) that Ray did not suffer any actual damages to be trebled. 
For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, PRS LLC's arguments should not be well taken 
and this Court should enter an order reversing the Trial Court's order denying Ray the 
statutorily mandated trebled damages he is entitled to receive and thereafter remanding 
the case for entry of an additional judgment in Ray's favor in the amount of $264,000.00. 
I 
PRS LLC'S REPLY BRIEF CONTAINS 
INACCURATE STATEMENTS THAT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND 
WHICH SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BY 
THIS COURT 
A. PRS LLC's "Statement of the Case55 and "Statement of Facts" include no less 
than eight (8) misstatements of fact that are not supported by Record 
evidence/ 
Rules 24(a)(7) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a 
party on appeal support all statements of fact and references to the proceedings below by 
citations to the Record. In its Reply Brief, PRS LLC makes several inaccurate statements 
that are not supported by the Record evidence and should be disregarded by the Court. 
See, Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co, 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978) (the Supreme 
Court will not consider any facts not properly cited to or supported by the Record); Steele 
v. Board of Review of Indus. Common, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (granting 
also, R. 165-66; R. 176 (Plaintiffs September Affidavit at f 14.) 
4. In its Reply Brief at footnote 3, page 16, PRS LLC acknowledges it did not request the 
Record incident to preparation of its Briefs. Given the extension of time it was granted to 
file its Briefs, it is unclear as to why PRS LLC chose not to obtain a copy of the Record 
and include proper references to the Record as required by Rule 24(e) Ut.R.App.P. 
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appellee's motion to strike where appellant failed to support its statement of the facts with 
citations to the pages in the Record). 
PRS LLC's first misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is as 
follows: 
1. "PRS LLC refused to comply with Ray's 3-day notice and 
unlawful detainer action on the basis that its rights to the 
leasehold flowed from PRS Corporation, not from Ray.... 
(R.251-279)" PRS LLC's Reply Brief at p. 3. (emphasis 
supplied) 
The underlined portion of this statement is not supported by the Record evidence. 
In fact, in PRS LLC's entire Memorandum in Opposition to Ray's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at R. 251-279 (herein "PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum"), PRS LLC argued that 
it5 was directly entitled to the rights and benefits of the alleged lease agreement.6 
5. In PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum below, it defined Pipe Renewal Service, LLC as 
"PRS," (R. 279) and repeatedly claimed that it was in privity of contract with Ray under 
the alleged lease agreement on at least five (5) occasions: 
i. "Hunting's assertion that PRS occupied and rented the Property on a month-
to-month basis is absolutely false. PRS occupies and rents the Property 
pursuant to the Lease Agreement ("Agreement") executed on or about 
December 19, 1991. See, Lease Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A." 
R. 278. 
ii. "Therefore, the Said notice is a violation of Hunting's contractual 
responsibilities and entitles PRS to "costs and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney's fees", pursuant to f^ 14 of the Agreement. See, 
Agreement at page 4, attached hereto as Exhibit A." R. 278. 
iii. "PRS occupies the Property pursuant to the Agreement." R. 276. 
iv. "Yet the facts clearly demonstrate that PRS and Hunting have a valid and 
binding Lease Agreement." R. 275. 
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PRS LLC's second misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is 
as follows: 
2. "PRS Corporation currently occupies, and has 
continuously occupied the Premises since the mid 1980s. 
(R.382-388)." PRS LLC Reply Brief at p. 7. 
This statement is not supported by any competent Record evidence. In fact, the 
only portion of the Record cited to by PRS LLC at 382-388 consists of a Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Reconsider and the same is clearly insufficient to constitute 
competent evidence in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
v. "PRS and Hunting have a valid Lease Agreement and do not operate on a 
month-to-month basis." R. 275. 
PRS even sought recovery of attorney's fees under the alleged lease agreement, to-wit: 
"Hunting's attempt to arbitrarily raise rent, effort to wrongfully evict, and 
litigation compelling PRS expend considerable funds to defend against a 
law suit without merit all constitute a breach of covenants contained in the 
Agreement. PRS therefore respectfully reiterates its request for an 
awarding of attorney's fees as two independent grounds provide a basis for 
such relief." R. 273. 
6. PRS LLC makes a similar inaccurate statement in PRS LLC's Reply Brief at page 8 as 
follows: 
"During the course of the proceedings, Ray motioned the Trial Court for 
summary judgment. (R. 138-140). In defense, PRS LLC submitted the lease 
agreement between Ray and PRS Corp and asserted that the right of 
possession properly flowed from the tenant - not Ray. (R.251-279)." 
PRS LLC Reply Brief at p. 8. Rather than belaboring the issue by repeating the same 
argument, Ray respectfully submits that the same analysis is applicable. 
7. The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that Rule 56(e) Ut.R.Civ.P. requires a 
party opposing summary judgment to present admissible evidence in the form of 
5 
affidavits or other competent evidence to properly demonstrate a fact issue exists: 
"The language of this rule [56(e)] is clear. Indeed, we have previously held: 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment 
and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials 
allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are 
no genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit 
affirmatively discloses the existing of such an issue. Without such a 
showing, the Court need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable 
law, the moving party is entitled to judgment." Busch Corp. v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Furthermore, Utah Supreme Court has previously held that affidavits including 
statements not based on information and belief, as well as hearsay and opinion testimony, 
should be disregarded in ruling on summary judgment, to-wit: 
"The opposing affidavit submitted by defendant did not comport with the 
requirements of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P, i.e., such an affidavit must be made 
on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Statements made merely on information and 
belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not be 
admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an 
affidavit. 
A review of defendant's opposing affidavit reveals no evidentiary facts but 
merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in 
regard to the transactions." Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 
508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). 
See also, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). Certainly a 
Memorandum signed by counsel which is not notarized or based on personal knowledge 
is insufficient to meet the necessary evidentiary requirements of an affidavit as set forth in 
Rule 56(e). The same analysis applies to Defendant's Counsel's oral argument before the 
Trial Court - Defendant's Counsel was not placed under oath or testify based on his 
personal knowledge, thus a memorandum or oral argument, absent necessary citation to 
relevant evidentiary materials is insufficient to create a material issue of fact. See, Rule 
7(c)(3)(B) Ut.R.Civ.P.; Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, f 12, 156 P.3d 175 
(upheld Trial Courts' award of summary judgment where opposing party failed to comply 
with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) Ut.R.Civ.P. required to provide appropriate supporting citations). 
6 
PRS LLC's third misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is as 
follows: 
3. "At no time during the more than twenty year period that 
PRS Corporation has occupied the Premises pursuant to the 
lease agreement has it breached the terms of either the verbal 
lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement. (R. 184; R. 
252; R. 872 p. 9)." PRS LLC's Reply Brief at p. 7. 
This statement of fact is wholly unsupported by the Record evidence. In fact, the 
portions of the Record below cited by PRS LLC are wholly inapplicable. The Record at 
872, p. 9 is a portion of the transcript of the oral argument before the Trial Judge and 
references to PRS LLC's counsel's argument are insufficient to constitute competent 
evidence. See, footnote 7 hereinabove. Further, the Record at 184 and 252 are exhibit 
dividers which are irrelevant (PRS LLC was on notice of this problem as the same 
deficiencies were previously pointed out in Ray's Appeal Brief at fn. 30 p. 36-37) and 
therefore fail to support the alleged statement that (i) PRS Corporation continually 
occupied the Property for 20 years or (ii) whether it breached any verbal or nonverbal 
lease agreement. 
PRS LLC's fourth misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is 
as follows: 
8. It is undisputed on appeal that an agreement to lease real property for more than one 
(1) year is subject to the statute of frauds and must be in writing. See, Utah Code Ann. § 
25-5-3 (1953). Further, the statute of frauds prohibits an oral assignment of a lease for a 
term of more than one (1) year. See, Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold 
Mining Co., 134 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1943) (holding oral agreement to extend lease is subject 
to the statute of frauds). 
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4. "Ray has received, each and every month, the agreed upon 
sum of $2,000.00 outlined in the Agreement. (R. 182-200, 
R.371-388 at 8;)(R.371-388; 755-768)." PRS LLC Reply 
Brief at p. 7 
Again, this statement of fact is not supported by Record evidence. The Record at 
182-200, 371-388, and 765-768 are portions of PRS LLC's Memorandum's below, 
including a copy of the lease agreement and do not contain any Record evidence. The 
Record at 377-78 is an Affidavit of William Lauf, but it does not make any mention of the 
alleged receipt of rent from PRS Corporation or any other entity under the alleged lease 
agreement. 
PRS LLC's fifth misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is as 
follows: 
5. "In 2004 PRS Corporation created additional business 
entities to better serve its growing needs. One such entity was 
PRS LLC. (R. 872 p. 5; R 382-388; R. 755-768). The limited 
liability company served as a managerial entity overseeing the 
day-to-day needs of the various business entities' operations. 
Accordingly, it paid many of the corporations' bills including 
rent to Ray. (R. 719-721). For approximately 18 months said 
practice continued without objection from the Ray. (R. 872 
pp. 5-6; R. 755-768.)" PRS LLC Reply Brief at p. 7-8. 
The Record at 872, p. 5-6 is a portion of the transcript of oral argument before the 
Trial Judge and is nothing more than references to PRS LLC's counsel's oral argument, 
which arguments are insufficient to constitute competent record evidence on appeal. See, 
footnote 7 herein. The Record at 719-721, 755-768, are portions of PRS LLC's 
Memorandum's below and once again constitute nothing more than mere argument by 
PRS LLC's counsel and do not constitute competent evidence necessary to support PRS 
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LLC's statement of facts between this Court. See, footnote 7 herein. 
PRS LLC's sixth misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is as 
follows: 
6. "Then on August 15, 2005, Ray sent PRS LLC a notice of 
rent increase. (R.6). The notice stated that Ray knew not with 
whom he dealt, that he had no contract with PRS LLC, and 
that the monthly rent was increased from $2,000.00 to 
$7,500.00 per month (R.6). See generally R. 755-768." PRS 
LLC Reply Brief at p. 8. Emphasis supplied. 
Ray respectfully submits that the underlined portion of the statement is not 
supported by any Record evidence. The Rent Increase Notice is expressly addressed to 
PRS LLC, and makes no mention that "Ray knew not with whom he dealt." A true and 
correct copy of the Notice of Rent Increase is attached hereto as Exhibit A for the Court's 
convenience. 
PRS LLC's seventh misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is 
as follows: 
7. "The issues of damages remained outstanding, but the 
issue of eviction had become moot by Ray's own admission 
as the PRS LLC had vacated the Property." PRS LLC's Reply 
Brief at p. 9 (underlining emphasis supplied). 
Ray respectfully submits that he did not "admit" that PRS LLC vacated the 
property thereby "mooting" the damage issue but, rather, the dispute regarding issuance 
of an order of restitution became moot.9 It is undisputed that PRS LLC has, subsequent to 
9. It seems odd for PRS LLC to make this argument in its Reply Brief when PRS LLC's 
counsel vigorously sought to strike that portion of Ray's counsel's Affidavit referencing a 
letter from PRS LLC's counsel, Daniel Sam, confirming the fact that PRS LLC had, in 
9 
the Court's Ruling and Order granting, in part, Ray's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated November 1, 2006 (herein "SJ Ruling"), vacated the property. R. 664; R. 821. 
PRS LLC's eighth misstatement of fact (which is not supported by the Record) is 
as follows: 
8. "The Trial Court held that Ray suffered no actual damages 
and that based on Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 
1952), that the Plaintiff was not entitled to treble damages." 
PRS LLC's Reply Brief at p. 10 (underlining emphasis 
supplied). 
The Trial Court did not rule that Ray suffered no actual damages but instead 
awarded $88,000.00 in damages for unpaid rent which is why PRS LLC has appealed to 
this Court. To that effect, the Trial Court's ruling explicitly provides, in relevant part, 
that: 
"Because the Plaintiff would have had no right to possession 
of the property, the Court cannot see how the Plaintiff was 
damaged beyond not receiving the increased rental amount." 
R. 819-20 (emphasis supplied). 
Ray will also address this issue in more detail at Argument III(B) hereinbelow. 
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(7) and (e) Ut.R.App.P., Ray respectfully requests that this Court 
strike the above quoted portions of PRS LLC's Reply Brief and refuse to consider its 
unsupported "facts" on appeal. 
fact, vacated the Property in December of 2006. R. 731-737 (objecting to f s 3 & 4 of 
Mr. Dyer's Affidavit and Exhibit A thereto). Judge Anderson subsequently granted PRS 
LLC's request on this issue. R. 819. 
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B. PRS LLC's Reply Brief improperly raises a new argument that the Trial 
Court implicitly found PRS Corporation occupied the Property and should 
not be considered by this Court. 
For the first time on appeal, PRS makes the following assertion in its Reply Brief: 
"PRS LLC argues that the Trial Court's January 8th (R.577-
580), February 2nd (R. 594-599), and July 2nd (R.817-822) 
Rulings effectively constitute findings that PRS Corporation 
and other entities occupy the property." PRS LLC's Reply 
Brief at p. 28. 
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the reply brief 
of an appellant "shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing 
brief." The Utah Supreme Court has previously refused to address issues first raised by 
an appellant in its reply brief unless they are in response to a new argument. See, 
Burgandv v. State of Utah, 1999 UT App 208, f 12 fn. 1, 983 P.2d 586 (refusing to 
consider issue on appeal raised for the first time in a cursory discussion in reply brief). 
This Court has repeatedly held that issues raised for the first time in reply memoranda are 
not properly before the Court. See, State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-4 
(Utah CtApp. 1993); Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding that 
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief were deemed waived). Ray respectfully 
submits that PRS LLC's "new" argument should not be considered by this Court incident 
to resolving the issues on appeal 
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II 
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE 
MANDATES DAMAGES BE AWARDED 
AGAINST ANY PARTY IN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER AND PRECLUDES 
DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION FOR 
NONJOINDER OF PARTIES 
The plain language of the Unlawful Detainer Statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7, 
et seq. (1992) mandates entry of a damages award against any of the parties defendant 
who are found to be in unlawful detainer of the premises, to-wit: 
"78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and 
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the 
premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a 
party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in 
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the 
plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who 
might have been made a party defendant; but when it appears 
that any of the parties served with process of appearing in the 
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against 
those parties."10 (1992) (Emphasis supplied). 
10. The plain language of this statute is fatal to PRS LLC's novel "weakest defendant" 
theory. Notwithstanding the fact that PRS LLC does not cite a single case or statute 
supporting this novel theory, the Legislature clearly intended on the plain language of the 
statute that a landlord may pursue any, some, or all tenant(s) under the Unlawful Detainer 
Statute and be entitled to recover damages. See, See, Aris Vision Institute v. Wasatch 
Property Management, 2005 UT App 326,1J27, 121 P. 3d 24 (Order of Restitution is not a 
prerequisite to trebled damages). 
Ray's counsel humbly apologies to the Court and counsel for the typographical error 
on page 45 at footnote 35 of Ray's Appeal Brief. For the Court's convenience, the quote 
from the 1957 version of the Unlawful Detainer Ray's counsel intended to insert should 
have read as follows: 
"Section 78-36-7, U.C.A. 1953 provides that: 
'No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is 
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
12 
Significantly, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-7(1) explicitly prohibits the dismissal of a 
complaint for "nonjoinder of any party who might have been made a party defendant;...," 
which dooms PRS LLC's nonjoinder argument in this case. 
PRS LLC's argument, without any citation to supporting caselaw, that PRS 
Corporation was a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 Ut.R.Civ.P. fails 
because Rule 19 is inconsistent with the plain language of §78-36-7(1), that is Rule 19 
permits dismissal of an action, whereas §78-36-7(1) of the Unlawful Detainer Statute 
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding, * * * but when it appears 
that any of the parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings 
are guilty, judgment must be rendered against them * * *.' (Emphasis 
ours.)" Tannery. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 1957) (underlining 
emphasis supplied). 
When juxtaposed to the 2005 version of Section 78-36-7, which was attached to the 
Addendum to Ray's Appeal Brief as a part of Exhibit A, the underlined portions are the 
only pertinent changes: 
"§ 78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is 
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in 
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be 
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a 
party defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties served with 
process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be 
rendered against those parties." (1992) (underlining emphasis supplied) 
The typographical error in inserting the wrong portion of the 1957 statute was an 
honest mistake and an oversight. Although Ray's counsel takes careful precautions to 
avoid such typographical errors, there was no intent to mislead the parties or the Court. 
Nonetheless, Ray's counsel believes that the analysis of the only substantive change in 
Section 78-36-7 in 1957 to 2005 from "need" to "shall" remains persuasive. 
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specifically precludes such relief. Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgt Comm. v. 
Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1989), Specifically, section 78-36-7 of 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute (quoted at p. 13 hereinabove) mandates that the Court 
"shall" enter judgment against those parties who are found to be in unlawful detainer. 
The statute further mandates that an unlawful detainer action shall not be dismissed for 
nonjoinder of a party, "nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the Plaintiff be nonsuited, for 
the nonjoinder." Thus by statutory enactment, PRS Corporation, a separate entity who is 
neither a tenant nor a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises on the Record 
evidence before this Court, is not a necessary or indispensable party precluding an award 
of damages to Ray under the Unlawful Detainer Statute. 
Further, PRS LLC argues that complete relief under the Unlawful Detainer Statute 
cannot be afforded to Ray because PRS LLC voluntarily vacated the Property on 
December 31, 2006, and hence, the Court should have dismissed Ray's Amended 
Complaint.11 However, an order of restitution is not required to award treble damages. 
See, Aris Vision Institute v. Wasatch Property Management, 2005 UT App 326, ^ 27, 121 
P. 3d 24 (holding the unlawful detainer statute does not require restitution as a 
prerequisite to award damages). 
Assuming arguendo PRS Corporation was a necessary party for the payment of 
restitution, when the Order of Restitution issue was mooted by PRS LLC's vacating the 
11. Ray's counsel takes exception to PRS LLC's inaccurate argument that Ray conceded 
that PRS LLC vacated the Property thereby mooting his claim for damages. See, PRS 
LLC's Reply Brief at p. 9 and argument 1(A) at pages 9-10 hereinabove. 
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Property, any argument that Ray could not obtain complete relief under Rule 19 
necessarily failed when the only remaining issue of damages against PRS LLC did not 
require the presence of any other parties. Bonneville at 1020 (The deficiency may be 
overcome by asserting only those claims for relief that do not require the presence of 
other parties (emphasis supplied). 
Further, PRS LLC's defense to Ray's trebled damage claim necessarily fails 
because it has failed to point to one shred of competent Record evidence that PRS 
Corporation, or any other entity, was in possession of the Property when the unlawful 
detainer action was commenced. In fact, PRS LLC's only defense to Ray's request for 
12. At footnote 30 to Ray's Appeal Brief, he noted as follows: 
"that PRS LLC has not pointed this Court to one shred of competent Record 
evidence that PRS Corporation was in "actual occupation of the premises 
when the action [was] commenced." It is undisputed that PRS LLC is the 
only entity that paid rent to Ray for over two (2) years prior to the 
commencement of this action and was therefore the tenant of the Property. 
R. 156; R. 165-166; R. 178. Ray properly served A Rent Increase Notice 
and a subsequent Three Day Notice on PRS LLC. R. 165; R. 177. Neither 
PRS LLC nor any other person or entity responded to the Three Day Notice 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit. R. 165; R. 177. Had PRS Corporation 
been in actual occupation of the Property, it could and should have notified 
Ray of the same and taken any necessary steps to preserve its rights, if any, 
by seeking to intervene in the proceedings below." Ray's Appeal Brief at p. 
36 fn. 30. 
In PRS LLC's Reply Brief, it has failed to identify any specific portion of Record 
evidence that any other entity was in possession of the property during the relevant time 
period. Instead, PRS LLC, for the first time, argues that the Trial Court made an implicit 
finding of fact that there were other entities in possession of the property. PRS LLC's 
Reply Brief at p. 28, 29 fn. 17. PRS LLC's argument should not be well taken and is 
more specifically addressed in Argument III(B) hereinbelow. To the extent that PRS 
LLC raises this issue for the first time in its Reply Brief in support of its appeal, this 
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trebled damages is that the Trial Court implicitly found there arguably may have been 
other entities either entitled to possession or in possession of the Property with the only 
piece of Record evidence arguably supporting its position to be an alleged lease 
agreement between Ray and a third party PRS Corporation. 
ni 
PRS LLC'S ARGUMENT, FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL, THAT IT IS A THIRD 
PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE ALLEGED 
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH PRS 
CORPORATION SHOULD NOT BE WELL 
TAKEN 
PRS LLC has now changed its position regarding its tenancy of the Property three 
times. First, In PRS LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to Ray Hunting's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated October 6, 2006 (herein PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum) (R. 251-
279), it argued that PRS LLC was a party to the alleged lease agreement and that it was 
entitled to the rights and benefits of the alleged lease agreement. R. 275. PRS LLC's 
original position was contrary to Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ^ f 53, 
48 P.3d 895 and the Trial Court issued its SJ Ruling determining that PRS LLC was not a 
party to the alleged lease agreement and it was in unlawful detainer as a result. 
In light of its initial flawed strategy that failed before the Trial Court, PRS LLC 
Court should disregard the same as new argument that is not raised in response to Ray's 
Brief of Appellee. See, Burgandv, Phathammavong, and Coleman, cited at p. 11 
hereinabove. 
13. Please refer to Argument section III(B) hereinbelow for a more detailed analysis in 
response to PRS LLC's "implicit" finding argument. 
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then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and changed its position to argue that PRS LLC's 
use and occupation of the Property was subject to PRS Corporation's alleged lease 
agreement as an oral sublease. R. 872 at p. 8, lines 2-3; R. 385-386. However, an 
agreement to lease real property for more than one (1) year is subject to the statute of 
frauds and must be in writing. See, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953). Further, the statute 
of frauds prohibits an oral assignment of a lease for a term of more than one (1) year. 
See, Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 134 P.2d 1094 (Utah 
1943) (holding oral agreement to extend lease is subject to the statute of frauds). Thus, as 
a matter of law, PRS LLC is not entitled to the benefit of any alleged written lease 
between Ray and PRS Corporation in the absence of a written agreement effecting an 
assignment of the same; however, no such written assignment is contained in the Record 
of the proceedings below because, ostensibly, no such written assignment exists. Thus, 
the Trial Court properly denied PRS LLC any relief on its legally insufficient "oral 
assignment" theory. 
Now, in apparent recognition of the dispositive nature of Holmes Development, 
PRS LLC argues for the first time on appeal that it was a third party beneficiary to the 
alleged lease agreement. However, PRS LLC is nowhere identified or mentioned in the 
alleged lease agreement in direct contravention to Holmes Development. Under Holmes 
Development, unless a party is an identified third party beneficiary to a lease/contract, the 
Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that separate legal entities are not bound by, or 
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entitled to the benefit of, the contractual obligations/rights of another. See, Holmes 
Development at % 53. Ray respectfully submits that PRS LLC cannot (beyond its whole 
cloth arguments) show this Court where it is facially identified in the alleged lease 
agreement as an intended third party beneficiary to the alleged lease agreement. PRS 
LLC's new argument should not be well taken. 
The Trial Court relying on Holmes Development, properly ruled that the alleged 
written lease with a third party, PRS Corporation, was not relevant to the unlawful 
detainer action herein for two (2) reasons. First, PRS LLC is not a party to the alleged 
written lease agreement and therefore does not have standing to enforce the same because 
PRS LLC is a separate legal entity from PRS Corporation. See, Holmes Development at 
Tf53. And second, because there was no assignment14 of any claims/rights under the lease 
14. PRS LLC's counsel admitted in oral argument before the Trial Court that there was 
no assignment of the alleged lease agreement by PRS Corporation to PRS LLC: 
"24 [Mr. Sam]: ... It's the same 
25 entity. It's the same business activity. It's the same 
1 principals that - the only thing that changed was between 
2 December of 2005 and January - December 2004 and January of 2005 
3 was that the name on the check changed from Pipe Renewal Service 
4 Inc. to Pipe Renewal Service LLC. It's the same business. The 
5 incorporation is still there operating the same business. 
6 The Court: You're indicating to me it's the same, but 
7 legally it isn't the same. 
8 Mr. Sam: Legally the -
9 The Court: Legally - 1 guess - 1 guess you're using it 
10 - you couldn't use that as a shield very well if- if let's say 
11 the PRS Inc. suffered a catastrophic loss - 1 mean they're just 
12 two entities in my judgment. They're two separate distinct legal 
13 entities. 
14 Mr. Sam: They are. They are. 
18 
agreement from PRS Corporation to PRS LLC, PRS LLC could not claim a breach of any 
agreement to which it was not a party thereto. See, Holmes Development at ^ [53. 
In Holmes Development, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a virtually analogous 
situation to the case at bar and noted that separate, but related entities, cannot claim the 
benefit of the other entity's rights, to-wit: 
"FN6. It may be that Holmes Development, LLC, and 
Holmes Ventures, LC, have the same management and may 
be practically indistinguishable. However, the two are legally 
separate entities and were created as separate entities for a 
purpose. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-402 (Supp.2001). 
Therefore, we refuse to recognize them as the same entity for 
standing to sue on a contract." Holmes Development, LLC v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 38, ^[53, 48 P.3d 895 (Emphasis supplied). 
On the face of the alleged written lease, PRS Corporation, not PRS LLC, is a party 
to that alleged written lease. Regardless of whether PRS LLC and PRS Corporation 
"have the same management and may be practically indistinguishable..." they are 
nevertheless two (2) separate legal entities and PRS LLC cannot litigate this matter in 
behalf of PRS Corporation. Judge Anderson so held and this Court should affirm the 
denial of PRS LLC's Motion to Dismiss. 
15 The Court: I don't seen an assignment of the 
16 Corporation's interest in the lease anywhere in here. 
17 Mr. Sam: No. It didn't happen." R. 872 at p.6-7. 
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IV 
PRS LLC MISREADS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION IN A MANNER WHICH IS 
FACIALLY INCONSISTENT WITH IT'S 
RULING 
A, PRS LLC requests this Court to misread the Trial Court's Decision to include 
a finding that Ray suffered "no actual damage" contrary to the express ruling 
in its July 2, 2007, Decision awarding Ray $88,000,00 as unpaid rent/damages. 
PRS LLC does not dispute the Trial Court's ruling that it was in unlawful detainer 
of the Property. Furthermore, does not dispute, and therefore concedes, once a Defendant 
is found in unlawful detainer that trebled damages are mandatory based on the plain 
language of the Unlawful Detainer Statute once unlawful detainer is established. See, 
PRS LLC's Reply Brief at p. 29, 34.15 Instead, PRS LLC only disputes what constitutes 
damages under the Unlawful Detainer Statute and argues that Ray could not have suffered 
any actual damages because a separate third party entity may have an alleged lease 
agreement regarding the Property or be in possession of the Property. 
The entire quote from the Trial Court, taken in context, is as follows, to-wit: 
"Instead, the Court will hold to the position that it has taken 
previously in this case. Even if PRS, LLC had vacated the 
premises, the Plaintiff would have been unable to retake 
15. See also, Ray's Appeal Brief at pp. 42 citing, Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch 
Property Management, Inc., 2006 UT 45, f 11-13 143 P.3d 278 (the Utah Supreme Court 
held that trebled damages are mandatory once unlawful detainer of the premises is 
established; Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 678-9 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (reversing trial 
court's denial of trebled damages in unlawful detainer action, holding trebled damages 
under § 78-36-10(3) were mandatory); Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930) (holding 
that it is "mandatory upon the Court to render judgment for three (3) times the amount of 
damages"); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025-6 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (holding 
trebled damages under § 78-36-10 were mandatory). 
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possession of the subject property until lawfully dealing with 
PRS, Inc.'s alleged rights under the lease. Because the 
Plaintiff would have had no right to possession of the 
property, the Court cannot see how the Plaintiff was damaged 
beyond not receiving the increased rental amount. On this 
point, the Court is persuaded by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1952), which (contrary to the Plaintiffs reply 
memorandum at 8) very clearly address the issue of whether 
treble damages for unlawful detainer are appropriate when a 
non-party to the suit enjoys possession of the subject property. 
While the cases are distinguishable on some factual points, 
the fact of the matter remains that so long as [PRS, Inc.] 
remained in possession, it is difficult to see how [Mr. 
Hunting] could be damaged by that fact that [PRS, LLC] 
remained there. Even if [the LLC] had moved, [Mr. Hunting] 
would have had no right to possession of the premises as 
against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered 
no actual damage. 
See ]d- at 449. Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby 
denies plaintiffs request for any treble damages in this 
matter." R. 819-20. (underlining and italics emphasis 
supplied) 
This quote is a portion of the Trial Court's July 2, 2007, decision and the forgoing 
quotation followed the $88,000.00 damages award to Ray in the form of his requested 
increase in rent. Contrary to PRS LLC's counsel's assertion, the Trial Court did not 
determine that Ray suffered no actual damages. Taken in context, the Trial Court ruled 
that Ray suffered no actual damage beyond the unpaid increased rent in the amount of 
$88,000.00. 
Ray's reading of the Trial Court's decision is further supported by the May 31, 
2007, Ruling entered by the Trial Court denying Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Damages filed April 6, 2007 (R.600-607) (herein "PRS LLC's 
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Damages Motion"). In denying Defendant's Damages Motion, the Trial Court ruled as 
follows: 
"While the Court is not convinced that the Plaintiff is 
entitled to the amount [of damages] sought, the Court 
cannot conclude that the Plaintiff has not been damaged 
to some extent by the Defendant [PRS LLC] in this matter." 
R. 771. (bracketing supplied) 
Furthermore, the plain language of the Unlawful Detainer Statute and the cases 
previously cited in Ray's Appeal Brief have not been disputed by PRS LLC to the effect 
that the increase in monthly rent constitutes the bare minimum of a landlord's damages. 
See, Ray's Appeal Brief at p. 42-43. Moreover, the fact that a Writ of Restitution or 
possession of the property is no longer in dispute does not, ipso facto, deprive Ray of the 
damages owed by PRS LLC. See, Aris Vision Institute at [^7. To hold otherwise would 
permit a defaulting tenant or subtenant to escape paying any damages for its unlawful 
detainer by delaying litigation and then vacating prior to being found unlawful detainer. 
Such a result would completely eviscerate the purposes of the Unlawful Detainer Statute 
and suggests that PRS LLC believes the Legislature intended to permit renters to escape 
the legal obligations to pay increased rent. Ray respectfully submits PRS LLC's position 
is not supported by any caselaw on any of the provisions in the Unlawful Detainer Statute 
- hence, it should not be well taken. 
PRS LLC's citation to Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952) without any 
legal analysis should also not be well taken. See, State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 
(Utah 1998) (noting implicit in Rule 24(a)(9) Ut.R.App.P., that briefs contain not just 
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bald assertions and citations, but development of cited authorities and reasoned analysis). 
Perkins is distinguishable on the following four grounds: 1) Perkins involves the legal 
enforceability of liquidated damages and forfeiture provisions contained in a real estate 
purchase contract; 2) Ray's counsel could not locate a single case that cites to Perkins for 
the proposition that a court should award nominal damages in an unlawful detainer action. 
3) Perkins is factually distinguishable from the case at bar because Perkins involved a 
husband and wife who were both parties to a written real estate purchase contract with 
their vendor; and, 4) in Perkins, the parties conceded that both the husband and wife were 
in actual occupancy of the premises. 
In the case at bar, PRS LLC is not a party to any alleged contract/written lease but 
claims to be a mere temporary incidental third party beneficiary of an alleged lease (R. 
385) - a status that is a legal nullity under Holmes Development, LLC, at % 53. Finally, 
the Record is bereft of any evidence that PRS Corporation was in actual possession of the 
property during the time period for which damages were requested and awarded below.16 
B. In footnote 17 of PRS LLC's Reply Brief, PRS LLC improperly requests this 
Court absent any Record evidence, to determine that the Trial Court 
implicitly found PRS Corporation was in possession of the Property at the 
time of commencement of this case. 
In footnote 17 of PRS LLC's Reply Brief, and without providing a single citation 
to the Record below that contains any competent evidence supporting its position that 
16. Despite PRS LLC's claim that PRS Corporation was in actual occupation of the 
premises, PRS LLC has not cited any competent evidence in the Record below that the 
PRS Corporation was in possession of the Property at the statutorily required time of the 
commencement of the unlawful detainer action. See, footnote 7 hereinabove. 
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PRS Corporation was in possession of the property at the time of commencement of this 
1 7 
case, PRS LLC asks this Court to interpret the Trial Court's refusal to enter an Order of 
Restitution as constituting an implicit factual "finding" that PRS Corporation was in 
possession of the Property. Ray submits PRS LLC's position is not supported by the 
Record evidence is inconsistent with Judge Anderson's Ruling and should not be well 
taken. 
In footnote 17 of PRS LLC's Reply Brief, PRS LLC takes portions of Judge 
Anderson's Rulings below out of context and asks this Court to interpret them in a 
fashion that Judge Anderson entered factual findings, on summary judgment, that PRS 
Corporation was in possession of the Property at the time of commencement of the case. 
First, on January 30, 2007, during oral argument on PRS LLC's Motion for 
Reconsideration, the Trial Judge made the following ruling: 
"16. The Court: Okay. Thank you. 
17. I want to thank counsel for the presentation here. Mr. 
18. Sam, I - 1 am going to deny your motion to reconsider. When I 
19. entered my summary judgment ruling this was fairly simple and 
20. fairly clear to me that in fact Pipe Renewal Service LLC was the 
21. party in place, they were paying the rent. The plaintiff 
22. complied with the statue, give them notice, a month to month 
23. tenant proper notice has to comply with the rent notice. They 
17. PRS LLC would like this Court to determine that the alleged lease agreement, and 
nothing more, is sufficient to demonstrate that PRS Corporation was in physical 
occupation of the property. However, the simple fact is that PRS Corporation's registered 
agent is William L. Lauf, the same registered agent of PRS LLC. R. 378. If PRS 
Corporation was in actual possession of the Property on the requisite date, a simple 
affidavit by Mr. Lauf (its corporate officer) was certainly within its ability to provide to 
the Trial Court. The fact that PRS LLC did not provide the Trial Court with any such 
necessary affidavit for Mr. Lauf is dispositive and defeats PRS LLC's argument, in toto. 
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24. didn't do it. The rest of the proceeding seems to me to follow 
25. along the lines of the case law and the law." R. 872 at p. 33. 
Judge Anderson's statement that "PRS LLC was the party in place," acknowledges 
that in issuing its S J Ruling, there was no competent evidence before the Trial Court that 
PRS Corporation was in possession of the property during the statutorily required time 
period. The Court further noted during oral argument, on January 30, 2007, as follows: 
"3. The Court: But go ahead. I don't know how many other 
4. tenants are in the building, but I guess from hearsay I 
5. understand there are several." R. 872 at p. 12. (emphasis supplied). 
The Court's candid expression confirms that despite PRS LLC's counsel's 
attempts to testify on PRS LLC's behalf at oral argument on its Motion for 
Reconsideration by claiming that PRS Corporation was in occupation of the premises,19 
PRS LLC has not provided any competent evidence in the Record below that the PRS 
Corporation was in possession of the Property at the time of the commencement of the 
unlawful detainer action. See, Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, ^ flO, 147 P.3d 439 
("Summary judgment may.. .not be denied based solely on inadmissible hearsay"); Norton 
18. The Trial Court expressly denied PRS LLC's Motion to Reconsider and 
reaffirmed its SJ Ruling: 
"The court will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsideration. After 
entertaining oral argument on the issue, the Court is unconvinced that the 
order granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be set aside. 
The Court's previous ruling and order will therefore stand unchanged." R. 
599 (emphasis supplied). 
19. PRS LLC's counsel's oral argument does not meet the evidentiary requirements of 
Rule 56(e) to constitute admissible evidence. See, footnote 5, 6, 16 & 17 hereinabove. 
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v. Blackhamu 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (inadmissible evidence cannot be considered 
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment). 
CONCLUSION 
Ray respectfully requests that this reverse the Trial Court's order denying trebled 
damages and remand for entry of an additional judgment in Ray's favor for trebled 
damages in the amount of $264,000.00. 
DATED this j ^ day of / W j } , 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0 -
Phillip/W. Dyer, Esq. 
Carey A. Seager, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Ray Hunting 
MI\E:\client\Hunting\Brief of Appellant (Reply 080820) 
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Exhibit A 
THREE DAY NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR VACATE 
TO: Pipe Renewal Service, LLC 
ATTN: William L. Lauf, Registered Agent 
5500 East 5750 South 
Vernal, Utah 84079 
You are hereby notified that you are delinquent in payment of the monthly rent due for 
the premises and real property occupied/used by you at the address shown above. 
You are further notified that you are to do one of the following: 
1. Within three (3) days after service of this notice upon you, you are hereby required to 
pay in full the rent now owing due to your occupancy/use of the premises and real 
property located at the above address. The rent currently due is $7,500.00 
constituting monthly rent (payable in advance on the first (1st) day of the month) in 
the sum of $7,500.00 due for September of 2005 less $2,000.00 paid to date, resulting 
in a net amount due of $5.500.00. If you vacate the premises pursuant to paragraph 
(2) hereinbelow, your partial payment will be applied so as to reduce the total amount 
you owe for rent for the month. 
OR 
2. You are required to vacate said premises within three (3) days and surrender 
possession of said premises with keys to Ray Hunting at 847 West 500 South, Vernal, 
Utah 84078. 
In the event of your failure to pay the net rent amount due of $5,500.00 or vacate the said 
premises and real property within such period of three (3) days, you will be unlawfully detaining 
possession of said premises and real property. In accordance with the provisions of Section 78-
36-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, you will be liable for treble damages for such unlawful 
detainer, and an action will be commenced against you to evict you from said premises and said 
real property and to take judgment against you for the net rent due of $5,500,00 accrued plus 
treble damages for the period you are unlawfully detaining possession of said premises, together 
with any damages to said premises and court costs. 
Please immediately notify the undersigned of your intentions. 
Dated this / :5 day of A^-pi^i^c^z^y , 2005. 
<<7 
R^Huafing / / 
847 West 500 South J>^ 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
NOTICE 
It shall be unlawful for any person, upon vacating or removing from dwellings, store rooms or 
any other building, to fail to remove all garbage, rubbish and ashes from such building and 
premises and also the ground appertaining thereto, or to fail to place same in a thoroughly 
sanitary condition 24 hours after said premises shall be vacated. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lynnae C. Jensen, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she served the REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT RAY 
HUNTING upon the following parties by placing two (2) true and correct copies thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Daniel S. Sam, Esq. 
William L. Reynolds, Esq. 
SAM & REYNOLDS, PLLC 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
and mailing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States 
Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 2 ^ day of tk\UJOUMJT 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this W1 day of i W f 2008. 
My Commission expires: 
\ ^ * 
Notary Public i,,,,,"" 
CAREYA.SEAGER I 
136 South Mam Street, Suite 221 • 
Salt lake Ctty, Utah 84101 | 
My Commission Expires • 
October 18,2010 I 
State of Utah . 
—I ( M ^ ^ ^ y 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
Salt Lake County, UT 
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